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Abstract
This article examines how and why regulatory influences tend to embed within the
practices of co-production. Informed by empirical data derived from semi-structured
interviews conducted with a sample of experts in co-production, the analysis seeks to
illuminate some of the ‘soft’ and ‘interactive’ forms of regulatory work that are performed.
In so doing, the discussion provides a ‘lightly’ critical reading of co-production and draws in
Erving Goffman’s hitherto neglected use of the concept of regulation. Framed by this work,
a distinction is drawn between the regulation of co-production and regulation by co-
production. The analysis contributes to a growing literature on some of the subtle and
sophisticated ways in which regulation is being conducted in contemporary societies and
how these contribute to the governance of social order more generally.
Keywords
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Designers of regulatory architectures typically seek to avoid two pathologies. ‘Over-
regulation’ occurs when there is too much regulatory activity. It is to be avoided on the
grounds that the ‘costs’ of regulating outweigh the benefits of any risk or harm mitigated.
Overly intrusive regulation can also impede and intrude upon the area of social life that is
its object. Conversely, ‘under-regulation’ arises when a regulatory regime is imprecisely
configured or calibrated, lacking sufficient ‘grip’ upon any presenting risk or threat. The
quest to navigate between these two potentials has shaped the conception of a number of
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new regulatory models, such as ‘smart’ and ‘responsive’ regulation (Ayres and
Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin et al., 2010). Promoted as more dynamic and adaptive than
‘top-down’ orthodox models of ‘command and control regulation’, where particular
liabilities of over-regulation and under-regulation have been repeatedly diagnosed, these
developments are part of wider and deeper shifts in the logics and rationalities of
governance.
Regulation is a key and increasingly important instrument of governance, and as such,
the growing accent upon regulatory responsiveness, is itself an inflection of a recognition
that key processes of governance are increasingly complexly constituted. For instance, in
recent years, several new policy frames have been brought forward with the intent that
they should alter how public service delivery is conceived and performed (Jones et al.,
2013; Le Grand, 2003). One example being the currently vogue-ish notion of ‘evidence-
based policymaking’ and using systematic review and randomized control trial meth-
odologies to directly inform the design and delivery of key public services (Breckon,
2015; Halpern, 2015). This ‘experimental governance’ effectively seeks to integrate a
regulatory influence on the grounds that robust and rigorous research is assigned a role in
steering activity towards ‘what works’.
Allied to but distinct from experimental governance has been the rising policy influ-
ence of ‘behavioural science’, colloquially dubbed ‘nudging’ (Thaler and Sunstein,
2009). This seeks to limit explicit and intrusive regulation, by manipulating the ‘choice
architectures’ people are exposed to (Berndt, 2015). The idea being that by so doing,
people will elect to act in prosocial or beneficial ways, absent any overt external direc-
tion or instruction (Dolan et al., 2012). Deploying social-psychological techniques to
persuade and influence public behaviour has become an increasingly prominent feature
across policy domains such as public administration, health and crime (Halpern, 2015).
A third set of innovations in the broader refiguring of public service delivery and
governance has pivoted around the concept of co-production. The think tank New
Economics Foundation (NEF) defining it as:
Co-production means delivering public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship
between professionals, people using services, their families and their neighbours. Where
activities are co-produced in this way, both services and neighbourhoods become far more
effective agents of change. (Boyle and Harris, 2009)
As well as featuring in debates around public service reform, similar processes have
been advocated for knowledge generation. There is a shared commitment to the notion
that by reducing the ‘distance’ between ‘authors’ and ‘users’, a higher quality, more
resilient and more effective product should result (Sharp, 1980; Whitaker, 1980).
Although possessing a considerable legacy, a distinct revival of interest in
co-production has been evident in the context of public sector austerity, with multiple
governmental actors advocating or expressing interest in its precepts (Durose and
Richardson, 2016; Welsh Government, 2014).
Positioned in this way, co-production is of particular interest because it implicitly
contends that by promoting a working closeness between authors and users of an idea or
service, the need for regulation is at least minimized or potentially obviated. Indeed,
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‘strong’ advocates of co-production assert it is largely antithetical to regulation, partic-
ularly in its more orthodox and traditional forms.
This article, however, argues for a more sophisticated and subtle rendering of the
relationship between co-production and regulation. Informed by empirical data explor-
ing the nature and processes associated with co-productive working, three principal
claims are made. First, the empirical analysis illuminates how a range of regulatory
mechanisms and influences tend to embed within co-production arrangements. It is
argued these function as forms of ‘soft regulation’ whereby participants in co-
production mutually steer and accommodate the conduct of those they are interacting
with. So rather than seeing regulation as an anathema to co-production, it is an account
that maintains the regulation of conduct actually occurs through some subtle and intri-
cately interactive forms woven into the fabric of co-productive arrangements.
The analysis accents two principal ways in which co-production and regulation inter-
twine. These are conceptualized as the ‘regulation of co-production’ and ‘regulation by
co-production’. The former focuses upon the external mechanisms brought to bear upon
co-productive arrangements to steer them. Contrastingly, regulation via co-production is
concerned with how the mechanics and dynamics of regulatory influence are woven into
the fabric of the process of co-production itself. This conceptual distinction constitutes
the second key claim.
The final claim is that at a more theoretical level, new insights into the conduct of
regulation within the contemporary social order can be generated by drawing in ideas
from the work of Erving Goffman. Goffman has achieved intellectual renown for his
close readings of human behaviour and social interaction. He is best known for his work
on ‘dramaturgy’ (Goffman, 1959) and for delineating ‘the interaction order’ (Goffman,
1983). The former is concerned principally with how the social identities that individuals
project when co-present with each other are configured according to the norms and
conventions of the setting in which they are situated. The allied but distinct notion of
the interaction order attends in finely granular detail to the frequently ‘seen but unno-
ticed’ ways people mutually adjust their conduct, thoughts and emotions to take account
of those with whom they are engaging. While these interactional dynamics are of direct
relevance to understanding the conduct of regulation, herein we identify a far more direct
and compelling connection between Goffman’s ideas and the conduct of regulation, than
has been made hitherto. Framed by his understandings of the inherent drama of social life
blended with insights into the micropolitics of social interaction, we show how his work
keys into understanding how regulation is experienced. This is notable we assert,
because of how, when compared with the volume of work on the activities of regulators,
the ways in which regulation is experienced by those subject to it remain a relatively
neglected topic in sociolegal studies.
The next section describes the empirical data collected and analysed, while also
bringing forward some theoretical resources to help interpret these. This is followed
by a more detailed account of the interactions between regulation and co-production. In
the penultimate section, the preceding points are used to address some wider implica-
tions about the condition of concepts as they make the journey from a ‘pure’ intellectual
form into something applied in practice with ‘real-world’ impact. Specifically, we con-
tend that ideas (and their authors) are subject to ‘tarnishing’ and ‘muddying’ in order to
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get them implemented and working within the situational contingencies of social, polit-
ical and economic life. In this sense, they become ‘dirty concepts’. Thinking in such
terms helps us to understand how and why mechanisms of co-production have increas-
ingly integrated regulatory influences. The article concludes by considering the wider
implications of these findings for understanding the conduct of regulation and co-
production in the contemporary social order.
Design and Method
The empirical data reported herein are derived from a 5-year research programme,
using a multi-method research design to explore and understand some key innova-
tions in how regulation is conceived and conducted. This wider programme has
framed the specific empirical and conceptual themes pursued, where a series of
14 extended semi-structured interviews concerned with the role of regulation in
co-production are analysed.
Interview participants were sampled from three groups: representatives of think tanks
and charities who had performed ‘moral entrepreneur’ roles in promoting co-production
(n ¼ 4), workers in local and national governments operationalizing co-production in
some way at either strategic or implementation levels (n ¼ 4) and representatives from
community organizations engaging in co-production schemes, across a range of situa-
tions and settings (n ¼ 6). Sampling around these categories was designed to capture a
diverse range of perspectives, with access to interviewees negotiated via contacts
involved in the wider research programme. There were a number of refusals to partic-
ipate, in part reflecting how the research was conducted at the height of the UK gov-
ernment’s austerity drive and how acute cuts to public service budgets were being
implemented. Negotiating access with the think tank and government representatives
was especially time-consuming and complex and was facilitated via a specific gate-
keeper. This accords with Mikecz (2012) who argues that elites are often surrounded
by multiple gatekeepers and that access must be carefully negotiated.
Following the lengthy access negotiations, interviews were conducted between
January and March 2016. Most were conducted in the participants’ workplaces in quiet
meeting rooms. Utilizing a semi-structured interview schedule to steer the flow of
conversation and make the most of the allocated time, the majority lasted around 1 h,
with all interview interactions recorded and fully transcribed. They were then inputted
into NVivo 11 (for Mac) and subject to thematic analysis.
Reflecting their status as part of a much larger data corpus and more wide-ranging
theoretical endeavour, in terms of how they are treated herein, they are understood as the
kinds of ‘exemplary evidence’ that Manning (2016) highlights as part of his ‘pattern
elaborative theory’ (PET). The intent of PET is to deploy especially luminous data to
foreground exploratory and tentative ideas that might subsequently be subject to more
rigorous and robust empirical testing. Accenting a creative and inference-based
approach, it is certainly coherent with the logics underpinning this article as it inter-
rogates some of the subtle and intricate ways in which regulatory influences embed
within the practices of co-production.
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Decentring Studies
The rise to prominence of ‘responsive’ and ‘smart’ regulation perspectives was itself a
refraction of a deeper set of epistemological and empirical shifts as scholars located in
multiple disciplines sought to reconfigure their understandings of the arrangements
between state and society. This involved them delineating specific roles and functions
for a range of so-called intermediary and ‘hybrid structures’ (Powell, 1990; Williamson,
1991).
In terms of the implications of this shift for regulation specifically, an especially
influential and insightful account was Teubner’s (1983, 1984) systems theoretic inspired
discussion of the ‘regulatory crisis’ inflecting the role of law in society. He defined
regulatory law as ‘a political mechanism of social guidance’ (Teubner, 1984: 381) which
was, he asserted, continually having to negotiate a fairly fundamental ‘regulatory tri-
lemma’. According to his diagnosis, there was a recurrent and ongoing need to negotiate
and avoid three particular species of problem in the law–society relationship: (1) a basic
incongruence of law and society, (2) the over-legalization of society and (3) the over-
socialization of law. This is a theoretical framing clearly resonant with the pathologies of
‘over-’ and ‘under-regulation’ highlighted in the opening paragraph of this article. The
tendency for these problems to arise and attempts to avoid them had a ‘structuring’ effect
on the organization of law and its shaping and steering of human conduct and behaviour.
Teubner’s diagnosis is present in Black’s (2001: 104) analysis of ‘decentred regula-
tion’, albeit she developed it rather differently. Echoing Teubner, she identifies both
positive and normative dimensions to the decentring of regulation. For Black, however,
the principal issue of concern is how governments do not, should not (and perhaps
cannot) secure a monopoly over the conduct of regulation and how it inherently engages
other actors without governmental involvement or formal approval. This conceptual shift
from a state–society hierarchy to a landscape of ‘heterarchies’ induces the state’s role to
become one of the mediators, facilitators and enablers. Thus, the contemporary conduct
of regulation needs to be cast as fragmentary and involving multiple centres of power
and sites of delivery.
Overlapping themes and interests can be detected in the more recent work of the
proponents of ‘regulatory intermediary theory’ (RIT). Proposed as a way of more accu-
rately rendering the range of relationships engaged in the conduct of regulation, they
emphasize how many contemporary regulatory arrangements depend upon the involve-
ment of third-party organizations actively mediating between regulators and regulatees
(Abbott et al., 2017). However, from the point of view of this article, as currently
configured, RIT accounts tend to be limited by their concern with the network effects
deriving from relationships between regulatory actors, and their implicit understanding
that power flows down, and regulation is devolved downwards through ‘chains of inter-
mediation’ (Abbot et al., 2017).
Intriguingly, however, Black and her conceptual ‘fellow travellers’ in regulation
studies are not the only ones to be accenting ‘decentredness’. Scholars across a range
of disciplines, who study conduct and policy processes closely aligned with the activities
of regulation, are all foregrounding ideas and data with more than a passing ‘family
resemblance’ to one another. For example, the political scientist, Bevir (2016; Bevir and
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Needham, 2017) has written about the salience of ‘decentred governance’. Accenting an
avowedly ideographic mode of analysis, Bevir and Needham (2017: 626) suggest that
the key impetus for such an approach is:
. . . that neither the intrinsic rationality of markets nor the path dependency of institutions
properly determines whether policies are adopted, how they coalesce into patterns of gov-
ernance, or what effects they have.
There are clear compatibilities and connectivity with the work of criminologists on
‘nodal governance’ (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). There are
affinities also with Garland’s (2001) concept of ‘responsibilization’, where he talks of
momentum in the conduct of social control whereby state agencies have increasingly
required other actors to take on the mantle of preventative policies and practices.
Although their language and concerns are different, there is a fundamental consensus
across these accounts that, in terms of how social order is routinely produced and
reproduced, this involves auspices beyond those of the state.
A second similarity is potentially more problematic though. For although each of
them has provided an important critique of the orthodox positions pertaining to their
respective disciplines, fundamentally these accounts retain a focus upon the providers of
regulation, governance and social control. Far less attention has focused upon how the
products of these ‘decentred’ provisions are experienced by those subject to them. This is
particularly pronounced in relation to the study of regulation, where there is a pro-
nounced neglect of these more ‘existential’ considerations.
Theorizing Regulation Differently with Goffman
Reflecting upon the nature of this limitation, a potential alternative can be derived by
drawing upon the work of Erving Goffman. Specifically, in his ‘Behavior in Public
Places’, Goffman (1963) repeatedly invokes the concept of ‘regulation’. This is worth
interrogating in some detail on two grounds. First, because of its potential in developing
a more supple and subtle understanding of the conduct of regulation, reflecting the kinds
of detailed insight Goffman’s methods and concepts afforded to other domains of social
life. Second, although there is an extensive secondary literature inspired by Goffman’s
scholarship, no one to date has picked up on his use of the concept of regulation (Ditton,
1988; Drew and Wootton, 1988; Manning, 1992; Smith, 1999; Trevino, 2003).
Goffman’s position on regulation has always been more implicit and presumed. It is
undoubtedly there, given his sustained interest in how co-present interactions and
encounters are navigated and negotiated, and especially how people actively work to
make these viable and ‘repair’ them when rules and conventions are infracted. That said,
his ideas and approach have directly influenced a number of those with more formal
research interests in regulation. This is especially evident in the work of several members
of what we might label ‘The Oxford’ tradition in sociolegal studies, who have collec-
tively demonstrated an interest in capturing the detail and nuances of the enactment of
administrative procedures of law and how they depart from the rhetoric of ‘law in
books’.1 Rock’s (1973) study of debt collection by the English Courts, for example,
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utilizes several of Goffman’s studies in working out a suitable theoretical frame. Rock’s
book was a direct influence on Hutter’s (1988) ethnography of environmental health
officers that foregrounds how regulatory outcomes are frequently the product of a pro-
cess of negotiation between regulators and regulatees. In terms of its dominant concep-
tual themes, Hutter’s work shares much with Hawkins’ (2002) magisterial account,
where he argues that regulating agencies typically utilize multiple negotiated and
compliance-seeking strategies before they resort to formally invoking law.
McBarnet’s (2003) work on public compliance with taxation policy was important in
shifting the focus of attention from the work of regulators to regulatees. The key insight
being that citizens retain a degree of agency in terms of how they respond to tax laws and
associated directives. These were themes also present in Hutter’s (1997) study of envi-
ronmental regulation, which depicts a sequence of moves and countermoves between
those charged with securing compliance and those subject to the regulatory standards, as
they interactively negotiate an outcome.
Across these studies, albeit they are more or less explicit in acknowledging this, there
are a series of conceptual themes traceable back to Goffman. Namely how the public
appearances of regulatory action may belie a more complex set of arrangements that have
been conducted behind the scenes, such that norms of conduct and behaviour, and not just
formally prescribed rules, become an important influence upon what is actually transacted.
In Behavior in Public Places, Goffman talks explicitly about regulation, tying it to the
functioning of social order as follows:
. . . a social order may be defined as the consequence of any set of moral norms that
regulates the way in which persons pursue objectives. The set of norms does not specify
the objectives the participants are to seek, nor the pattern formed by and through the
coordination or integration of these ends, but merely the modes of seeking them. (Goffman,
1963: 8)
Elements of this definition are clearly consistent with a core feature of how regulation
is commonly understood across academic disciplines, namely that it involves a steering
of the process, rather than determining any outcome.
Later in the same essay, Goffman elaborates how norms of social conduct occasion
defined and shared ‘situational proprieties’ that regulate social interaction, and that:
The code derived therefrom is to be distinguished from other moral codes regulating other
aspects of life . . . : for example, codes of honour regulating relationships; codes of law
regulating economic and political matters; and codes of ethics, regulating professional life.
(Goffman, 1963: 24)
In his posthumously published presidential address to the American Sociological
Association some 30 years after the above, Goffman (1983) would refer to this domain
of enquiry as the ‘interaction order’. In so doing, he was clearly conveying a sense in
which regulatory work is an intrinsic and necessary condition for how different mod-
alities of social order are developed and sustained. Although he did not consistently
invoke the concept of regulation, Goffman’s work represents a sustained attempt to
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foreground how various explicit and tacit rules of interpersonal conduct are navigated
and negotiated across a range of settings and situations.
This element of his work is especially pertinent in what Manning (1992) describes as
Goffman’s ‘ethnography of the concept of the total institution’. Informed by observations
of the behaviour of inmates in an asylum, he draws out more general propositions about
how those subject to ‘wrap-around’ and all encompassing regimens of surveillance and
social control are able to negotiate and subvert these. Critically then, despite the imposition
of procedures involving ‘mortifications of the self’ and the like, he demonstrates how those
subject to such routines are able to identify crevices and gaps of active resistance.
Vitally, what Goffman’s concepts and methods provide is careful attention to detail in
documenting and describing how specific actions and interactions are accomplished and
conducted, with all those engaged in such encounters actively contributing to what is
transacted, and how features of setting and situation influence such inimicably social
processes. Put another way, what Goffman attends to and inspires in those influenced by
his work is a focus upon what people actually do to regulate their own conduct and that of
others they are co-present with, rather than what they say they do when interviewed or
surveyed.
Compared with the more orthodox positions on regulation in the literature, what can
be distilled from Goffman’s formulation is the import of attending to the micro-details of
how regulatory influences manifest in practice and are experienced. These are qualities
lacking in the more ‘structural’ orientations of the decentred regulation and regulatory
intermediary theory positions. The idea that conduct is regulated and ordered by more
than just formal rules, and that ‘regulatees’ are not just subjects of the regulatory process
but actively engaged in how it unfurls, helps to illuminate how regulatory influences
present within co-production processes.
On Normative and Instrumental Co-producing
Innes (2014) summarizes the key practices of co-production as involving: co-definition,
co-design and co-delivery. That is, those constructing an issue, service or knowledge
should work collaboratively with others directly, in terms of understanding what pre-
cisely the matter at hand is, how it should be responded to and then delivering the
response. It is this ‘end-to-end’ quality that distinguishes co-production from other less
intensive forms of partnership working and collaboration.
The term ‘co-production’ was first coined by Elinor Ostrom when researching US
police work in the 1970s. Echoing concerns articulated by several other studies of
policing from this period, Ostrom and her team found something missing when the
police spent more time in patrol cars and were not so closely involved with the public,
as occurred when on foot patrol. They inferred that it was actually the contributions made
by the public when interacting directly with the police that effectively determined the
efficacy of policing services (Boyle and Harris, 2009). Ostrom used the term co-
production to refer to this relationship, defining it as:
The process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by
individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organisation. (Ostrom, 1996)
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She subsequently extended it as a more generalized critique of a tendency within
public service provision. An agenda that was supported by others, including citizen
participation in public policy (Cupps, 1977; Sharp, 1980), low productivity creating
deficits in the public sector (Lovelock and Young, 1979) and public service reliance
on the actions of policymakers, rendering them ineffective and inefficient during times
of fiscal constraints (Brudney and England, 1983). Accordingly, the idea of co-
production acquired increasing traction and currency. Whitaker (1980) advocated that
co-production champions the service user’s individual ability to accomplish desired
changes with the help of the delivery agent. Importantly, he identified multiple ‘types’
of co-production (Whitaker, 1980), assigning particular importance to where citizens and
agents work together to adjust the other’s expectations and actions. Positioned in this
way, modifying behaviour entailed joint considerations and decisions about a problem,
with reciprocal, active participation facilitating desired changes.
A salient point made by a number of those interviewed for this study concerned how
co-production in practice necessitates pragmatism and compromise. This was because,
almost inevitably, none of those engaging in co-production are going to secure precisely
the outcome anticipated at the start. For example, one policymaker reflected on their
experiences as follows:
. . . I know that as a result of that co-design piece it doesn’t look exactly as I thought it would
when I was going in which is great. Learnt loads from people shaping it in a different way.
(G1)
While not everyone spoken to was so enthused by the lack of control induced by such
arrangements, this notion that interaction between participants clearly shapes the out-
come accomplished clearly resonates with some concepts accented by Goffman. More-
over, there was a shared acknowledgement that it was important that those with power do
not impose their wishes and expectations upon the process.
This requirement to equalize relations and accommodate the interests and needs of all
partners was something mentioned by the majority of respondents. The following senti-
ment was fairly widely shared:
. . . So with the VCS stuff I’m trying to treat it as equal as it can possibly be. That I’m not
going to turn round after six months of work and go, ‘Oh by the way I’ve decided it’s my
money so I’m going to do something different with this. Never mind what everyone’s told
us or what we’ve talked about’. So I’m trying to get that much more equal. (G1)
A key feature of such accounts was that moving towards co-production was ‘effortful’
and not to be undertaken lightly.
Given that this is so, it is perhaps unsurprising that, in terms of co-production’s policy
transfer and importation into the United Kingdom, the timeline is rather hazy. Needham
and Carr (2009) suggest that despite less evidence of co-production’s rhetorical visibility
in the 1980s, it influenced many reform movements and did not entirely disappear.
Realpe and Wallace (2010) argue that Anna Coote introduced the co-production concept
to UK health services around this time, as a device to understand relationships between
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patients and clinicians. Also in the 1980s, in the housing sector, professional-driven
ideals (Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Boyle and Harris, 2009) began to break down when
professionals were forced to start consulting with policy-resistant homeowners nega-
tively affected by relocations to council estates (Birchall and Simmons, 2004).
After a period where increases in public participation had been slow, small scale and
met with resistance (Birchall and Simmons, 2004), the New Labour administration proac-
tively championed active citizenship, participation and collaboration (Newman et al.,
2004). Boyle and Harris (2009) later identified problems with the New Labour/‘third way’
methodology, arguing it failed to tackle the structural inequalities driving service demand.
This was attributed to ‘narrow’, cost-focused models that did not afford sufficient local
responsibility to allow social networks to develop and take strain off public services, and
so did not see the rhetoric of ‘consumer choice’ transpire into real mutual solutions.
A more recent government White Paper reflects this critical view of previous
approaches, highlighting the need for consultation and engagement with public service
users as well as needing to be driven by public priorities (HM Government, 2011). Many
argue that the social welfare system’s aim to tackle class inequality has been ineffective
(Coote and Franklin, 2009). As such, co-production is proffered as the alternative to the
problems and challenges previously experienced and premised upon the idea that service
users can help professionals make permanent change happen (Stephens et al., 2008).
Infused by such narratives, looking across the interviews conducted as part of this
study, two principal vocabularies of motive were offered as explanations and justifica-
tions for moving towards co-productive arrangements. First, there were ‘normative’
accounts premised upon the notion that it is the right thing to do. This is exemplified
in the following quotation:
It doesn’t make sense for people not to . . . have some sort of real role and to shape
services. (T3)
Framing co-production in this way didn’t really invoke any extraneous incentives or
benefits. In this sense, it differed slightly from a more ‘instrumentalist’ conception of co-
production, advocated on the grounds that it delivered its products more effectively and/
or efficiently. This was evident in a number of discussions, but was especially neatly
articulated in the following:
. . . you’re involving homeless people to help design services for the homeless . . . having
people actually involved in designing the services that they know most about, they know a
lot more about than somebody sitting in a darkened room writing a policy or designing a
service from a local government perspective. (G4)
An especially intriguing aspect of the empirical data pivoted around the relationship
between the normative and instrumental accounts. Nearly all of the interviewees went
out of their way to acknowledge that co-productive encounters were frequently intricate
and delicate, imbued with considerable complexity. Significantly, several proponents of
the normative position used precisely these issues to argue why co-production should not
be appraised on instrumental grounds:
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Well this is the trust thing . . . to all of the people we worked with we were like, ‘how would
you like to co-exist with us?’ And it’s like, we built trust by listening to them and then by
working towards the things that we shared as aims . . .And the thing is, between bigger
organisations trust is very hard. (C4)
Because co-production is not an easy process, for partners to work together willingly
and effectively, finding ways to develop a sense of trust is key. As the above quotation
highlights, there is a need to invest time to build and sustain relationships between
partners, but this can present a challenge.
Expectation management was understood as vital for sustainable co-production by the
majority of interviewees. There was a temptation, it was suggested, for those engaged to
get swept along by the rhetoric and consequently aspire for too much. Especially those
experienced in co-producing accented how it required all parties to moderate their
expectations and to be willing to compromise to some degree. That said, this pragmatic
disposition was itself counterbalanced by a clear belief that co-producing knowledge
and/or services does possess the potential to unlock new capacities and capabilities that
cannot be reached by more orthodox arrangements.
Co-production and Regulation
Traditionally conceived as ‘top-down’ and ‘command and control’ oriented, regulation
seems to contrast co-production’s core values of engaging ‘outside’ parties and facil-
itating equality and reciprocity. The more recent shifts to decentred ‘responsive’ and
‘smart’ models of regulation soften and blur this antipathy somewhat. But what was
striking about the interview accounts is how, although they did not necessarily talk about
‘regulation’ per se, the majority of interviewees acknowledged the presence of multiple
regulatory influences in their co-production work. Especially for those describing the co-
production of public services, one explicit mode of regulation emanated from economic
issues:
. . . it’s like a community centre in a way, they shouldn’t be all designed to the nth degree,
they should have some empty rooms that haven’t been purposed yet when they build
them . . . because then the community will decide what they need to be . . .But that doesn’t
fit council because they want to have it funded, ‘what are you getting the money for?’ (C4)
Funders’ desires to know what outcomes to expect as a return on investment clash
with ‘pure’ co-production. Multiple interviewees recalled compromises and ‘trade-offs’
as part of their efforts to secure and sustain funding. This included a recognition that their
ability to co-produce was constrained by the regulations and accounting requirements
emanating from their funding sources. Equally however, and perhaps more subtly, they
also voiced an expectation that funders looking to enable regulation must themselves
engage in some ‘trading-off’ to avoid over-regulating the process. They must modify
their usual behaviour to accommodate co-production, instead allowing the process to
partially self-regulate and deliver unprogrammed outcomes.
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An important permutation of the influence of economic considerations upon how
regulation happens in relation to co-production was that it may flux temporally. Espe-
cially for government officials, there was a recognition that planning future co-
production and making commitments become difficult in the months leading up to
elections. Trading-off in this situation and context, perhaps doing less long-term plan-
ning, for example, would not necessarily benefit co-production, but would be a necessary
compromise to proceed.
The accounts rehearsed above have a shared tendency to view the co-production–
regulation relationship in terms of the regulation of co-production. For example, budget-
ary considerations shape and mould what it is that can be co-produced and how. In this
sense, the regulatory work is implicitly conceived as lying outside of the co-productive
arrangements. In the rest of this article, we focus upon regulation by co-production. That
is how, in an often ‘seen but unnoticed way’, co-productive relationships absorb or
integrate regulatory influences into their standard operating processes.
‘Soft’ and Interactive Regulation
During an interview with a community worker engaged in safeguarding young people
deemed at risk of violent extremist radicalization, they discussed how several local
schemes had been designed collaboratively with parents and young people from the com-
munities believed to be affected. This was presented as an alternative to the inclinations of
the government’s formally constituted ‘Prevent’ programme, widely perceived as a
‘tainted brand’ (Innes et al., 2017; O’Toole et al., 2016). Talking about one specific
scheme, the community worker described how they had started working with local parents
to help ‘skill them up’ in terms of their ‘digital literacy’. This was on the basis that:
What’s actually going on is that, you know, mothers don’t necessarily know how to track
their children’s internet usage, things like that. (C2)
Here co-production was being harnessed to enable more effective parental regulation
of young peoples’ potentially risky behaviour. The interviewee went on to explain how
co-producing these activities affords constant dialogue and insight for community work-
ers. This was not formal regulation in the traditional sense, but rather flowed out of the
interactions between participants.
A common feature of such accounts was how, although the primary purpose of
entering into these relationships was not to deliver regulation, this is nevertheless what
happened. Through their interactions, mutual influence upon the behaviour and aims of
the others they were involved with occurred. Especially where such relationships were
successful, those involved also came to understand the constraints and requirements of
their partners and factored these into their own conduct. Thus, the style of regulation
engaged was largely tacit or implicit, operating interactively.
Where regulation is embedded within ongoing relationships, it often assumes a
‘softer’, more negotiated tone than where it is the primary objective.2 For instance, one
interviewee recalled how a lady in Cardiff opened her house as a space for local young
people over a period of around 18 months. The young people came in and took part in a
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range of activities such as learning to use her husband’s DJ equipment while he was at
work, becoming part of dance crews or just ‘chilled out’. Decisions on donations and
activities for this ‘project’ were made through co-production that took place between the
lady and the community. This developed a sense of self-regulation among participating
young people, but also interactive regulation through being involved in these negotia-
tions with the community. Particularly interesting is how this approach in turn shaped
relationships with other, more formal regulatory institutions, including youth services,
schools and police. As the interviewee recounted, the project: ‘regulated with
regulators’.
Blending this line of thinking with an earlier theme, there is an interesting angle in
terms of how effective co-producing was seen to involve constraining the potential to
express power. As one respondent described it:
If the power isn’t shared then sometimes it’s quite hard to actually really co-produce. (G1)
And as another reflected:
. . . there’s no point having something called co-production or co-creation or collaboration if
there are inequitable power dynamics at play, and unfortunately there are lots of those
around in this field. (C5)
It would be tempting to see such comments as suggesting co-production necessitates
power being ‘given away’ by its ‘owners’ to their new partners. However, reading across
the interview transcripts suggests a more subtle interpretation, involving a shift in the
forms of power. This can be conceptualized as being less reliant upon ‘hard’ power and
instead seeking to achieve similar aims through invocation of ‘soft power’ based upon
influence and persuasion.
Indeed, this seems fundamental to how regulatory mechanisms get picked up and
woven into the conduct of co-production. ‘Harder’ and more direct regulations would be
inimical to the delicate configurations through which decisions get made under co-
productive frameworks. But in a ‘softer’ form, they actually help to foster such arrange-
ments, giving a sense of the constraints that are being worked to and within. In this sense,
the integration of regulatory mechanisms into the processes of co-production had an
influence in sustaining relationships in the face of the challenges that are often
encountered:
I think in a way if there was one or two obvious brick walls, it would be relatively
straightforward to tackle then. But what we’re finding more is a series of trip wires . . . (T4)
As this respondent from a think tank that had invested in developing co-productive
approaches identified, there is a susceptibility for co-productions to be diverted and
distracted. In light of which, regulatory instruments embedded within the partnering
arrangements afforded a potential for self-correction. Here then we can see how co-
production has to navigate the issues of over-regulation. For as is indicated in this
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account, over-regulation occurs not just through the obvious blockers and impediments,
but manifests also in low-visibility issues that can derail intensive collaborations.
Drawing back from the specifics of discussing co-producing, this insight has wider
significance for understanding some of the complexities involved in how regulatory
work gets done in contemporary societies. It is not confined to institutions or agencies
with a formal remit. It is more widespread than this and increasingly infused into key
social relations. One especially intriguing aspect of which concerns the ways regulatory
mechanisms were increasingly nested in layers of relationships, with the consequence
that at some moments individuals and groups could find themselves positioned as reg-
ulators, whereas at others they would be the regulatees. For instance, the senior manager
of a community centre, who had sought to foster more of a co-production ethos with
parents in his decision-making regarding nursery provision, outlined how:
We’re kind of constrained by Ofsted requirements and other things, but the parents do have
a say in how things can be run. (C1)
He described a complex of regulator–regulatee relationships that are being switched
between. In the latter part of this quotation, he implied how the needs and desires
expressed by parents do influence provision. But at the same time, in foregrounding the
role of Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted), he
recognized that he has to act as a regulator upon the parental influence, on the grounds
that he is himself subject to some superordinate regulatory considerations.
This also serves as an important reminder that the argument being constructed herein
is not that ‘harder’ more formal kinds of regulation are disappearing or foregone, but
rather that co-production tends to be a very particular style of ‘soft and interactive’
regulation. Indeed, because co-production intrinsically operationalizes a fluid and nego-
tiated form of working, this soft and interactive quality of regulation seems quite impor-
tant. This is evidenced by the frustrations expressed by an individual recalling their
engagement with a research project employing a co-production methodology:
When I first engaged with [project] I hadn’t got a clue and so the language being used was
alien to me, I didn’t really understand where they were going and they hadn’t defined it.
They hadn’t bounded what we were doing. It was very loose and I found that incredibly hard
to engage with. (C1)
In the language of this article, this exemplifies the problems of ‘under-regulation’.
There is a sense of ‘anomie’ in terms of the dislocation and disenchantment felt by the
interviewee. As they went on, they described how all those involved in the work,
including the academic ‘authors’ of the project as well as the ‘users’, came to an
agreement that a more explicit regulatory frame was required, if anything of significance
was to be accomplished. Indeed, in this case, a modest degree of albeit subtly rendered
regulation was understood to be a sufficient, if not necessary, condition for ongoing
successful co-production.
Echoing an earlier point about the complexities and difficulties involved in co-
production and the role of power, for a number of professionals it was hard not to assume
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responsibility for some form of regulatory oversight. As one interviewee involved in
healthcare put it:
A lot of these professions we’re talking about, they have been trained for years . . . you don’t
want to sit there and think . . . ‘now my job is to coach someone or work this out together,
like I’m the one who is the doctor, let me tell you what to do’. (T3)
Accounts like this, provide some insight into how and why over-regulation occurs. It
was faster and easier for the healthcare professionals to assume responsibility and control
of the process than to engage in a more convoluted and intricate process of co-
production. But in so doing, the possibility of enabling more innovative and creative
possibilities was forestalled.
Looking across the empirical accounts of co-production in action, as opposed to its
description in books, there are certain compatibilities and points of resonance with the
concepts of regulation. The first of these concerns how, when compared with other
modes of social control, regulation attends more to the issues of process than outcome
(Innes, 2014). A defining quality of regulation is its focus upon standardizing aspects of
how something is accomplished (via technical modifications of procedure), rather than
closely specifying the defined outcomes to be achieved. This is analogous with the ways
co-production privileges the process of interaction and collaborative working over defin-
ing precisely in advance what the product is. Typically, partners enter into co-producing
arrangements with a broad goal in mind, but the agreed outcomes and ways of working
are shaped by the process.
A second defining quality of regulation is that it is codified, due to there being widely
understood and shared understandings of the rules of participation and processes that are
in play. Co-production’s focus on new ways of working often induces pressures for
codification: Methodologies and practices associated with working co-productively have
been developed to cope with its challenges. These methodologies and practices are
detailed in various catalogues, one such being a product of the People Powered Health
programme (Penny et al., 2012). It was designed to provide:
. . . a series of learning products explaining why the People Powered Health approach
works, what it looks like and the key features needed to replicate success elsewhere. (Nesta,
2013)
This distillation of procedures and practices that ‘work’ in this way implicitly attends
to and recognizes that such matters are not straightforward.
In different ways, both co-production methodologies and regulatory instruments are
in the business of behaviour modification, performed through a blend of incentives and
sanctions. Particularly relevant to co-production are the range of normative and instru-
mental incentives, outlined in previous sections, that are often invoked to encourage
certain forms of desired collaborative action. Cast in this way, behaviour modification is
clearly a fundamental consideration for all collaborative working, including co-
production, as organizational behaviour change is required to meet the respective goals
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of all partners. The process of working collaboratively between participants is, we would
argue, always intended to induce behaviour modifications in all concerned.
Co-production as a ‘Dirty Concept’
In their ‘pure’ theoretical formulations, representations of co-producing are typically
cast in relatively unproblematic ways. Theoretical discussions inevitably strip away the
layers of contextual detail and subtlety to delineate principal components. But particu-
larly for something as intricately fabricated as co-production, which involves multiple
actors, organizations and interests, interpretations and practices of co-production differ
and vary. Even more significantly, the reality of co-producing often departs in some
significant respects from the core precepts. However, rather than being a problem, this
should be understood as a necessary requirement for co-production as a practical accom-
plishment. In this sense, it can be understood as a ‘dirty concept’.
A ‘dirty concept’ is one that, as it travels from being ‘in books’ to a form of practical
action, becomes tarnished and distanced from its ‘pure’ conceptual origin. These com-
promises and amendments are necessary and inevitable if the ‘pure’ theoretical construct
is to have practical utility and traction. For complex undertakings such as co-production,
this means that what gets done in practice typically ‘resembles’ the theoretical model, as
opposed to reproducing all its elements in detail.
This ‘dirtying’ of a concept can sometimes lead people to question, or deny, that what
is actually being practiced constitutes the theoretical intent. For example, when discuss-
ing co-production one respondent said:
I think both at a service shaping and strategic level, there is an interest and people are happy
to use the language of it. But actually it’s being limited quite seriously when it comes to
practice. (T4)
For this interviewee, the degradation in fidelity between the concept and the practice
caused them to conclude that although the co-production label was frequently invoked,
its actual implementation was relatively rare.
Potentially, however, this is to expect too much of research-based theories and mod-
els. As another respondent pointed out, this time in respect of the practicalities of
committing to co-production from a government perspective:
At the moment we are very strictly in a position where we cannot make decisions that tie our
hands to the next government . . . you don’t want to come in and be told ‘sorry Minister you
will just have to do these things because the last government decided them all’, doesn’t go
down very well at all. (G3)
If this analysis is correct, authors of such ideas and frameworks need to accept that
they will become at least a little bit ‘dirty’. There is a ‘price to be paid’ if ideas are to
‘travel’ and influence policy and practice. In the following extract from an interview
with a respected and experienced community worker, some of these issues were
surfaced:
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So this is an example for me of where we started off with co-production in mind . . .The
reality is there is only so much things [sic] you can actually co-produce . . .Now, if we were
to open that up to the hundred or fifty plus young people that we interviewed and engaged
with in terms of framing the priorities and what the service should look like, I think it’s
going to be a bit challenging because there’s a finite resource. So there were certain things
we were able to be honest about what we were co-producing with stakeholders at times,
because it’s not with everybody all the time. (C6)
A pragmatic willingness to accept that these kinds of edits will occur does seem
important. For if the intellectual progenitor of a framework or model seeks to distance
themselves when inevitable practical difficulties are encountered, then it is harder for
others to justify why they should expend effort to work through any such tribulations.
An alternative strategy was to forego any explicit linkages. For example, one inter-
viewee told how a large organization she was familiar with had made a ‘conscious
decision’ to avoid the language of co-production. Another noted that one minister had
a particularly strong dislike for the term ‘co-production’, because he feels it’s something
they’ve been doing for a long time anyway. Both of these accounts suggest how language
matters in ‘selling’ ideas into new groups of potential users and also in sustaining their
interest over time. For some, the language of co-production was decidedly alienating and
to be avoided.
More concerning, however, were several accounts contending a more cynical intent
underpinning the policy adoption of the idea of co-production. Adherents of this per-
spective speculated that the language of co-production could be used as a cover for
service cuts:
. . . if that becomes sort of abandonment of issues by the public sector in the hope the
communities will pick up the pieces, I think sustainability becomes an issue very very
quickly. (G3)
I think it’s really difficult to talk about genuine co-production in the landscape of
where public services are right now . . . it can feel disingenuous when people . . . are
genuinely cutting back on essential services (T3)
These interviewees were clearly concerned about the co-production rhetoric being
used to disguise service cuts. Returning to some of the themes rehearsed towards the
start of this article, this extends our understanding of the normative and instrumental
justifications for co-production in a new and intriguing direction. Decreased govern-
ment provision and increased public participation in service delivery obviously
ring true with some of the co-production’s guiding predicates. However, where
co-production practices are only being used to replace and substitute for pre-existing
costly services, interviewees see this as deceptive. In this respect, co-production is
‘dirty’ in a rather different way.
Other ways in which co-production was understood to have been tarnished and
denuded in terms of its conceptual promise were as a result of it being misappropriated.
For example, the following interviewees note how co-production can sometimes take
place without being formally dubbed ‘co-production’:
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. . . they work in a co-productive way but perhaps they don’t call it co-production . . . (G2)
. . . it’s the DNA of what [we do] as a project. So we don’t call it co-production,
we just work with people in a certain way. (C4)
Such comments, supported by those of other interviewees, clearly echo earlier points
about the role of language. Where they are distinctive though is in recognizing the
difficulties of sustaining the idea that co-production nowadays is a ‘clean’ and theore-
tically ‘pure’ construct.
Across the interviews, examples cited as evidence of co-production clearly intimate
some service areas are doing more than others, notably health, social care and education.
As one interviewee put it, co-production seems to have gained reasonable stickiness
within health services (T2). The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it seems that
these are services the public can take some responsibility for and contribute to. For
example, someone who lives with a long-term illness might carry out the aspects of
their care at home (e.g. medication administration, diet, exercises), independently of a
healthcare professional, and therefore contribute to the management of their condition.
This sort of self-management and shared responsibility would not apply as easily to all
public services, where specific skills or authority might be needed.
Summarizing several of the themes brought forward in this section, one interviewee
told how:
We found a whole load of people who were doing it completely below the radar, because
they knew if they told people this was actually how they were doing their work, they’d
probably get into trouble, because this wasn’t what they were given permission to do. (T4)
That some practitioners might have gone ‘rogue’ to utilize co-productive meth-
odologies implicitly conveys how, from their organization’s perspective, this was a
tainted and undesirable approach. Co-producing ‘under the radar’ in this way
because management may not like it, has much in common with Goffman’s accounts
of how organizational life typically involves ‘front-stage’ and ‘backstage’ registers,
where public presentation and what actually gets done can be differentiated from
each other.
Conclusion
The principal claim of this article is that co-production frequently absorbs or integrates
regulatory influences into its working processes. This is reflected in the conceptual
distinction made between the regulation of co-production and regulation by
co-production. For some advocates of co-production, the latter notion in particular would
be anathema, as they conceive it as distinctly contrary to much regulation, but this is
simply not the case. Indeed, informed by the empirical evidence marshalled by this
study, there is an argument to be made that some form of regulation may be a necessary
condition for co-productive arrangements to be sustained.
Conceptual supports for this position have been distilled from the work of Erving
Goffman and those who have been inspired by his approach. In particular, we have
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sought to draw out his underappreciated implicit and explicit interests in regulation. For
what can be inferred from his work is how regulatory activities are not restricted to
institutions and actors positioned in superordinate roles, but rather, can be threaded
through the interactions and encounters between people and through the discourses and
rationalities they draw upon in negotiating these encounters. Accordingly, the empirical
analysis captures how there is frequent switching between the regulator and regulatee
roles. At some moments in time, under co-productive frameworks, particular actors are
responsible for overseeing the conduct of others, while their own performance is simul-
taneously being monitored and assessed. This is directly commensurate with the kinds of
social dynamics that Goffman identified in his detailed studies of social interaction. In
the context of scholarship on regulation, it develops a more nuanced and textured
account of what it is and how it is accomplished. What drawing in the work of Goffman
provides is a deeper understanding of some of the subtle and interactive ways regulation
is conducted. Coherent with which, rather than talking of regulation in terms of its
structures, systems, institutions, processes or mechanisms, the preference throughout
has been to invoke the term ‘regulatory influences’. This seeks to capture how, framed
by logics and practices of co-production, regulatory work is frequently achieved through
the specific techniques of framing and persuasion.
Seeing regulation as an intrinsic part of co-production is a significant departure from
conventional definitions of both concepts. Although some of the co-production literature
yields examples of ‘guides’ and ‘self-management’, regulation is rarely referenced. The
empirical data also challenged the existing idea of an ‘equal’, ‘reciprocal’ and ‘mutual’
co-production environment – this is in fact something that rarely transpires so smoothly
in practice. Here, we have a ‘dirty concept’.
In part, the emergence of co-production as a conceptual methodology and the
groundswell of support that it has attracted reflects the sense in which it was offering
a potential to overcome the problems of over-regulation, situated in a moment marked by
‘deep’ reconfigurations in relations between law, state and society. It is certainly the case
that where regulation is constructed at a distance from the actual authors and users of
services, it can fail to acknowledge and be responsive to the kinds of situated contin-
gencies that arise. However, it seems that, at least in terms of how it is rendered theore-
tically, co-production methodologies are susceptible to under-regulation. As a
consequence and as catalogued herein, those engaged in implementing and operationa-
lizing co-producing arrangements have displayed a tendency to integrate forms of ‘soft’
and interactive regulation into their practice.
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Notes
1. This label does not suggest that all of the work exhibiting these conceptual traits has been
conducted at Oxford, but rather that a number of key scholars have had some connection with
the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies there.
2. A quality it shares with other modalities of social control (Black, 1976).
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